



CORPORATE CONSOLIDATION AND OUTSIDE CONTROL OF ALASKA'S TRAWL FLEET

**An Analysis of Federally
Managed Trawl Fisheries**

SEPTEMBER 2026

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary	3
--------------------------	----------

Methodology	5
--------------------	----------

Key Ownership Findings	7
1. Dominance of Corporate Groups	
2. Outside Corporate Dominance	
3. Monopoly Over Heavy Infrastructure	
4. Foreign Equity Influence	

Implications of Corporate Consolidation and Outside Control	9
The Wealth Outflow	
The Barrier to Local Entry	
Governance and Policy Representation	
Resource Accountability	

Conclusion	16
-------------------	-----------

Appendix	18
Summary Vessel Matrix	
Summary Ownership Matrix	
Out-of-State Ownership Concentration Summary by Fleet	

References	21
-------------------	-----------

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Alaska's federally managed trawl fisheries in the Bering Sea Aleutian Islands (BSAI) and Gulf of Alaska (GOA) represent some of the most valuable commercial marine harvests in the United States.

This brief uses publicly available data to unmask ownership across four of the largest federally managed trawl catch-share programs operating in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska: Amendment 80 Groundfish Fleet (Amendment 80), American Fisheries Act Pollock Fleet (AFA), Pacific Cod Trawl Cooperative Program (PCTC), and Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Program (GOA).

Over the past three decades¹, federal management established catch-share programs (cooperatives and limited access privilege programs) for the four largest trawl fisheries in an effort to eliminate the "race for fish," improve safety, and enforce conservation measures. **However, an unintended structural consequence of assigning exclusive harvesting privileges based on historical landings has been out-of-state ownership.**

By tracing vessel permits single-purpose limited liability companies (LLCs) to their **Ultimate Beneficiary Owners (UBOs)**, analysis reveals a clear geographic disconnect: Out-of-state owners control **100% of the Amendment 80 fleet of catcher-processors** is **owned by out-of-state companies** and **98% of all catcher/processers** (42 of 43 factory ships). Key findings include:

Dominance of Corporate Groups

Just 15 corporate groups control about 60% of all vessels (98 of 163) operating across Alaska's major trawl catch-share fisheries.

Out-of-State Corporate Dominance

12 of the 15 largest corporate ownership groups — the Outside 12 — are headquartered outside Alaska, primarily in Washington State. Washington-based companies control 100% of the Amendment 80 fleet and 65% of the AFA Pollock fleet.

Monopoly Over Heavy Infrastructure

The top 15 control **100% of the federally permitted motherships** and **98% of all catcher/processers** (42 of 43 factory ships) across Alaska's major trawl catch-share fisheries.

Foreign Equity Influence

Strategic ownership extends beyond U.S. borders; several top Washington-based trawlers are parented by or structured as joint ventures with multinational Japanese seafood giants like Maruha Nichiro and Nippon Suisan.


The concentration of Alaska's industrial trawl fleet among outside corporate groups has reshaped the economic and governance landscape of coastal Alaska.

While harvesting occurs in Alaska waters, a significant share of the economic benefits generated by these fisheries accrues to corporate headquarters, investors, and maritime service networks located outside the state, particularly in Washington State. At the same time, the capitalization of harvesting privileges has created substantial barriers for new entrants and limited opportunities for local ownership of industrial-scale fishing assets. Because decision-making authority is concentrated among a small number of corporate groups, these organizations also play a significant role in shaping future management decisions affecting Alaska's federally managed fisheries.


Washington State-based ownership




Washington State-based companies own
100% of the Amendment 80 Fleet



Washington State-based companies own
70% of the AFA Pollock Fleet



Washington State-based companies own
66% of the Pacific Cod (PCTC) Fleet



Washington State-based companies own
46% of the GOA Rockfish Fleet

1 The transition to catch-share management in Alaska's federal groundfish fisheries occurred over multiple decades rather than through a single regulatory action. Key milestones include the establishment of the Community Development Quota (CDQ) Program in 1992, implementation of the American Fisheries Act (AFA) pollock cooperatives in 1999, Amendment 80 in 2008, the Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Program in 2012, and the Pacific Cod Trawl Cooperative Program in 2023. Collectively, these programs transformed most of Alaska's industrial trawl fisheries from limited-entry management to cooperative catch-share systems.

METHODOLOGY

This report uses publicly available data to unmask ownership across four of the largest federally managed trawl catch-share programs operating in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska, including:

- Amendment 80 Groundfish Fleet (Amendment 80)
- American Fisheries Act Pollock Fleet (AFA)
- Pacific Cod Trawl Cooperative Program (PCTC)
- Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Program (GOA)

The analysis began with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) permit and licensing records identifying vessels eligible to participate in each federal trawl program. Because many vessels are legally registered to single-purpose LLCs created specifically to hold an individual vessel, permit records alone do not reveal broader ownership patterns.

To identify Ultimate Beneficiary Ownership (UBO), publicly available information was compiled from:

- NOAA permit records and catch-share licensing logs
- State corporate filings in Alaska, Washington, and Oregon
- Public business registries and state corporations databases
- Company websites, press releases, and published fleet rosters
- Maritime vessel ownership databases (including C4ADS Triton data)
- Historical corporate records, SEC disclosures, and industry trade publications²

Where sufficient public information existed, vessel-owning LLCs were linked to their parent company or controlling organization. In cases involving joint ventures or partial corporate ownership, the report identifies known ownership relationships while recognizing that some privately held equity interests cannot be fully verified.

When evaluating ownership concentration across Alaska's trawl fisheries, it is critical to distinguish between unique physical vessels (hulls) and program-specific permit endorsements. Because federal catch-share programs operate on distinct seasonal and geographic schedules, major fishing companies maximize capital efficiency by deploying the same physical vessels across multiple catch-share fisheries throughout the year. Summing permit rosters across individual program tables yields a higher number of "program slots" or endorsements (137 total endorsements) across the top 15 — owners, whereas tracking back to physical vessel hulls results in 104 unique physical ships.³

To accurately evaluate fleet capacity and processing power, this report categorizes vessels into three distinct operational classifications:

Catcher/Processors (C/Ps)

Large vessels — commonly called factory trawlers — equipped to both harvest fish and process/freeze catch directly on board at sea.

Catcher Vessels (CVs)

Vessels that harvest fish and deliver their raw catch to onshore processing facilities or offshore motherships.

Motherships (MTHs)

Floating processing platforms that receive raw catch delivered at sea by catcher vessels for offshore processing.

Accordingly, this analysis should be viewed as a conservative estimate of ownership concentration based on publicly available information.



2 For more detailed source information, see the References section of this report.

3 Certain vessel classes — most notably the Amendment 80 factory trawler fleet — operate almost exclusively within their dedicated catch-share program. In contrast, catcher vessels owned by major groups like Trident Seafoods, Global Seas, and Great West Seafoods frequently hold permits in AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod, and GOA Rockfish programs simultaneously, transitioning gear and target species as seasonal openings shift from the Bering Sea to the Gulf of Alaska.

KEY OWNERSHIP FINDINGS

1. Dominance of Corporate Groups

When examining federal permit filings at face value, Alaska's trawl fisheries appear to be populated by dozens of independent operators. However, tracing individual vessel-holding LLCs back to their Ultimate Beneficiary Owners (UBOs) reveals that **ownership of Alaska's industrial trawl fleet is concentrated within a small, tightly knit group of owners.**

Across the four major catch-share programs operating in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska (AFA Pollock, Amendment 80 Groundfish, Pacific Cod Trawl Cooperative, and CGOA Rockfish), a total of **163 vessels** hold active harvest privileges.

Just 15 corporate entities control 98 of these vessels, representing 60% of the entire catch-share trawl fleet (98 of 163 vessels).

Historically, catcher vessels (CVs) were owned by independent family businesses and local captains. Today, capital accumulated under catch-share programs has enabled the top 15 corporate entities to aggressively expand horizontally: **56% of all catch-share catcher vessels (74 of 133)** are owned directly by or affiliated with these 15 major corporate groups.

2. Outside Corporate Dominance

While every vessel examined harvests in Alaska waters, the vast majority of strategic management, corporate administration, and capital returns reside outside the state. **Washington State — specifically the Greater Seattle and Puget Sound maritime hub — controls nearly every major industrial trawl fleet in Alaska.**

The 12 out-of-state corporate groups — or the Outside 12 — control 83 of the 104 vessels held by the top 15 ownership groups, representing approximately 80% of all vessels controlled by major corporate entities.

- **Amendment 80 Fleet:** Washington State-based companies own 100% of the factory trawlers targeting non-pollock groundfish (19 of 19 vessels).
- **AFA Pollock Fleet:** Washington State-based companies control 70% of the overall fleet (77 of 110 vessels) and 94% of all catcher/processors (16 of 17 vessels).
- **Pacific Cod (PCTC):** Washington State entities control 66% of the overall fleet (47 of 71 vessels) and 100% of catcher / processor capacity (5 of 5 vessels).
- **GOA Rockfish Fleet:** Washington State entities control 46% of the overall fleet (21 of 46 vessels), including 63% of catcher/processors (5 of 8 vessels).

WASHINGTON STATE
CONTROLS NEARLY
EVERY MAJOR
INDUSTRIAL TRAWL
FLEET IN ALASKA.

3. Monopoly Over Heavy Infrastructure

As vessel size, processing capacity, and operational complexity increase, independent ownership vanishes entirely. The top 15 out-of-state corporate groups maintain virtual total control over at-sea processing capacity.

These 15 entities control **100% of the federally permitted motherships** (20 vessels) and **98% of catcher/processors** (42 of 43 factory ships).

The lone factory ship outside this group represents an isolated, minor operation. Consequently, independent harvesters have zero independent, non-corporate pathways to process groundfish at sea, leaving them entirely dependent on corporate at-sea platforms or concentrated onshore plants owned by firms like Trident Seafoods, Westward Seafoods (Maruha Nichiro), and Unisea (Nippon Suisan).

4. Foreign Equity Influence

Strategic control over Alaska's trawl assets extends beyond U.S. borders. While federal maritime laws (such as the American Fisheries Act) mandate 75% U.S. citizenship ownership for harvesting endorsements, international seafood conglomerates maintain significant equity, financing, and supply-chain integration in top Washington-based fleets.

- **Maruha Nichiro / Umios (Tokyo, Japan):** Operates extensively across Alaska trawl fleets via subsidiaries like **Westward Seafoods** (major inshore processor), and joint ventures like **Golden Alaska Seafoods** and **Phoenix Processor LP** (AFA Mothership owners), **Bering North LLC** (10 AFA C/Vs), and **Alaska Boat Company** (5 AFA C/Vs).
- **Nippon Suisan / Nissui (Tokyo, Japan):** Holds direct operational control of **Unisea Inc.** (one of the largest inshore processing plants in Dutch Harbor) and holds major ownership stakes in **Glacier Fish Company LLC**, which owns 7 factory trawlers across the AFA and Amendment 80 fleets.

These Japanese parent firms provide long-term capital backing, global distribution networks, and processing infrastructure, further embedding top Washington State trawlersfleets into international corporate structures.

IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE CONSOLIDATION AND OUTSIDE CONTROL

Corporate consolidation and outside control ultimately determine who has access to Alaska's public fisheries, who captures the economic value generated by those resources, who has the resources and institutional capacity to influence fisheries policy, and who bears the environmental and social consequences of industrial fishing.

The evidence presented in this report points to a structural imbalance across all four dimensions. A relatively small number of predominantly out-of-state corporations control a disproportionate share of Alaska's industrial trawl fleet, including much of its most valuable harvesting and processing capacity. That concentration gives established firms advantages not only in fishing, but also in capital accumulation, market access, political representation, and regulatory influence.

The consequences extend beyond ownership itself. When the assets and decision-making authority associated with a public resource are concentrated outside the communities where that resource is harvested, economic benefits can flow outward, barriers to local ownership can increase, and political influence can become concentrated among a small number of well-resourced firms. At the same time, the environmental and social costs of industrial fishing remain concentrated in Alaska.

This creates a fundamental geographic and economic disconnect: those who control and profit from the resource are often not the same people or communities that live alongside the resource, depend on it, or bear the consequences of its use.

The implications of that structure are most apparent in four areas: the outflow of wealth from Alaska, barriers to local entry and ownership, the concentration of political and institutional influence, and the concentration of resource responsibility.

The Wealth Outflow

Big Trawl is a highly consolidated, vertically integrated industry whose ownership, management, and economic benefits are concentrated largely outside Alaska, particularly in Washington State. Although the fish are harvested in Alaska waters and the industry supports jobs and processing activity in the state, a substantial share of the economic value flows to non-Alaska residents and out-of-state corporate owners.

The industry's own economic analysis underscores this disconnect. The industry directly employs thousands of workers nationwide, but only 31% of those workers are Alaska residents; approximately 6,800 of 9,366 directly employed workers reside outside Alaska, including about 12% who reside outside the United States. The industry therefore relies heavily on a seasonal and nonresident workforce, particularly in seafood processing. State labor data show that more than 80% of Alaska seafood-processing workers are nonresidents, with nonresident employment reaching approximately 96 - 98% in some regions. Industry employment figures also count jobs or positions rather than necessarily representing stable, year-round full-time employment.

The out-of-state trawl workforce



**69% OF THE TRAWL INDUSTRY'S
WORKERS RESIDE OUT OF STATE.**

Also, the industry directly supports less than 1% of Alaska's statewide employment, while its workforce is heavily seasonal and nonresident. By comparison, Alaska's tourism sector supports roughly 48,000 jobs.

*\$450 MILLION IN
POLLOCK-RELATED
LABOR INCOME
FLOWS TO
WASHINGTON STATE,
COMPARED WITH
\$336 MILLION TO
ALASKA.*

The distribution of labor income similarly demonstrates the geographic imbalance. According to Northern Economics, approximately \$450 million in pollock-related labor income flows to Washington State, compared with \$336 million to Alaska. Thus, even before accounting for corporate profits, dividends, investment returns, and other forms of capital income, more labor income associated with the pollock industry is estimated to accrue in Washington than in Alaska.

The issue, therefore, is who captures the value created by Alaska's public marine resources. Alaska supplies the fish, the waters, the infrastructure, and the communities that absorb the industry's environmental and social consequences, while ownership of the vessels, processing capacity, and corporate enterprises is concentrated outside the state. A substantial share of the wealth generated from Alaska's fisheries consequently leaves Alaska, accruing instead to out-of-state corporations, investors, and maritime business centers. The result is an industry that extracts enormous value from Alaska's waters without returning a commensurate share of that value to the Alaskans and coastal communities where the resource originates.

The Barrier to Local Entry

The outflow of wealth from Alaska is reinforced by the barriers that prevent Alaskans from acquiring and retaining ownership of industrial fishing assets. Industrial fishing is inherently capital intensive, but federal rationalization programs have strengthened the position of firms that already control vessels, processing capacity, regulatory eligibility, established market relationships, and access to capital.

The American Fisheries Act (AFA), for example, created permanent sector allocations, established eligibility requirements, and facilitated cooperative structures within the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands pollock fishery. These reforms helped replace the race for fish with a more predictable and orderly industrial system, producing important safety and operational benefits. But they also transformed access to the fishery. Participation is no longer simply a matter of entering the fishery and competing for available harvest; it increasingly depends on controlling assets and relationships that are already concentrated among established operators.

That structure creates a substantial barrier to local ownership. An Alaska fisherman or new entrant seeking to participate at an industrial scale must secure an expensive vessel, obtain financing, navigate regulatory eligibility requirements, secure access to processing and marketing infrastructure, and often establish relationships within existing cooperative and sector structures. In a fishery dominated by large catcher/processors and vertically integrated corporations, those requirements create significant advantages for firms with existing capital and scale.

The result is a self-reinforcing cycle: concentrated ownership generates capital, capital facilitates further acquisition, and further acquisition makes it increasingly difficult for new Alaska-based owners to enter the sector. Rather than creating a pathway for locally accumulated wealth to build ownership of Alaska's industrial fisheries, the current structure can perpetuate ownership among established corporate interests — many of them headquartered outside Alaska.

This matters directly to the wealth outflow. When Alaska residents face high barriers to acquiring the vessels, permits, processing relationships, and other assets needed to participate at scale, the economic returns associated with those assets are more likely to accrue to the corporations and investors that already own them. The result is not simply that wealth leaves Alaska after it is generated; the structure of the fishery makes it harder for Alaskans to capture that wealth in the first place.

Governance and Policy Representation

The geographic concentration of ownership is also reflected in the political infrastructure surrounding Alaska's industrial trawl fisheries. Two of the sector's principal trade associations — the At-Sea Processors Association (APA), representing the offshore catcher-processor sector in the Eastern Bering Sea pollock fishery, and the Groundfish Forum, representing companies participating in the Amendment 80 non-pelagic trawl fisheries — are based in Seattle.

These organizations explicitly describe their roles as engaging with the institutions that make fisheries policy. APA states that it works with fishery managers, scientists, environmental organizations, and other industry participants and that its associate-member program supports its work with federal fishery managers, scientists, and elected representatives. APA also identifies the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) among the industry organizations and events with which it engages.

Groundfish Forum likewise states that its members have worked closely with the NPFMC and NOAA Fisheries for more than a decade on bycatch reduction and habitat management. Its history specifically identifies the organization's involvement in the development of Amendment 80, which the Council adopted in 2008 to allocate groundfish among fishery sectors and allow harvesting cooperatives to form among participating catcher-processors.

This creates an important distinction between where the consequences of fisheries policy are experienced and where some of the industry's organized policy capacity is located. Alaska communities bear the local consequences of decisions involving salmon and halibut bycatch, crab interactions, habitat protection, fishery closures, and allocation of marine resources. Yet some of the most organized industry voices advocating for the large-scale trawl sector operate from Seattle, where the corporate and maritime infrastructure supporting these fisheries is also concentrated.

This is a clear imbalance in institutional capacity. A relatively small number of large industrial fishing companies can pool resources through trade associations, maintain dedicated policy and government-relations staff, participate continuously in federal regulatory processes, commission research, and engage directly with decision-makers. APA, for example, maintains dedicated policy and outreach staff and describes its mission as working with federal fishery managers and elected representatives. Groundfish Forum similarly maintains an ongoing policy and technical relationship with the Council and NOAA.

This organized capacity matters because fisheries policy determines who can harvest Alaska's public resources, in what quantities, with what gear, under what bycatch limits, and in which areas. The companies affected by those decisions therefore have a direct economic incentive to participate intensively in the regulatory process.

Meanwhile, Alaska communities, small-scale fishermen, subsistence users, and other stakeholders who bear the ecological and economic consequences of industrial fishing do not possess comparable resources and sustained access to the policymaking process.

In this context, corporate consolidation and geographic concentration are also matters of political representation and institutional power. When ownership, corporate management, industry associations, specialized legal and regulatory expertise, and financial resources are concentrated among a relatively small number of companies — most headquartered outside Alaska — the capacity to influence the policies governing Alaska's fisheries can become concentrated as well.

Resource Accountability

Alaska communities bear the local consequences of decisions involving salmon and halibut bycatch, crab interactions, habitat protection, fishery closures, and allocation of marine resources, while most of the companies making the operational and investment decisions that shape those impacts are controlled by a relatively small number of predominantly out-of-state corporate owners.

When ownership of industrial fishing capacity is concentrated, environmental impacts and responsibility for managing them become concentrated as well. The same corporate groups that control a disproportionate share of Alaska's industrial trawl capacity also operate many of the vessels responsible for the sector's documented bycatch and other ecological interactions. Decisions about vessel deployment, gear, fishing practices, technology, bycatch avoidance, and investment in mitigation are therefore made by a relatively small number of corporate actors.

The scale of those impacts is substantial. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) observer and catch-accounting data show that trawl fisheries account for the overwhelming majority of documented salmon bycatch in the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska, as well as substantial shares of halibut, crab, and marine mammal interactions. Between 2017 - 2024, trawl killed 328 total marine mammals. Between 2017 and 2025, trawl vessels caught more than 3 million salmon as bycatch, including 386,385 Chinook salmon; an estimated 9.26 million crabs; and at least 57.5 million pounds of halibut. In 2025 alone, the trawl fleet killed or discarded approximately 97 million pounds of ecologically, culturally, and commercially important species from the Bering Sea and Gulf of Alaska, including more than 211,000 salmon and hundreds of thousands of crabs.

These impacts extend beyond the fishing grounds. NOAA's 2025 Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Bering Sea chum salmon bycatch recognizes that salmon taken as bycatch in the pollock fishery represent fish that otherwise could have returned to Western and Interior Alaska river systems and that bycatch reduces salmon available for subsistence, commercial, and recreational uses.

Scale of ecological damage
2017-2024



328 MARINE MAMMALS



3M SALMON



386K CHINOOK SALMON



9.2M CRAB



57M LB HALIBUT

The ecological costs of industrial trawling also extend beyond bycatch. Trawl gear can disturb seafloor habitat and damage benthic communities that provide food, shelter, and nursery habitat for other species. Bottom-contact fishing can damage or remove habitat-forming organisms such as corals, sponges, anemones, bryozoans, and other benthic invertebrates, and research in Alaska has documented persistent effects of repeated trawling on benthic communities, including long-term damage to large sponge communities in the Gulf of Alaska.

And while midwater or pelagic trawl gear is designed to operate above the seafloor, the gear often contacts the bottom, particularly when vessels fish close to the seafloor. When contact occurs, trawl gear and footropes can disturb or damage benthic organisms. The designation of gear as "midwater" therefore does not, by itself, establish that the seafloor is unaffected.

These impacts can persist because habitat-forming organisms such as corals and sponges may be slow-growing and require years or decades to recover. Repeated disturbance can prevent benthic communities from recovering and alter ecosystem structure over time. The ecological cost of that disturbance is borne by the marine ecosystem and potentially by the fisheries and communities that depend upon it.

This makes ownership relevant to resource and environmental accountability. The companies controlling the fleet also control the vessels, equipment, technology, and capital investments that influence where fishing occurs, what gear is used, and what measures are adopted to reduce bycatch and habitat impacts. Because ownership is concentrated, a relatively small number of corporate decisions can influence resource and environmental outcomes across a substantial portion of the fishery.

The geographic dimension compounds this imbalance. Alaska provides the waters and ecosystems from which these fisheries derive their value, while Alaska communities experience many of the consequences when industrial fishing affects salmon, halibut, crab, habitat, and other marine resources. Yet much of the ownership, corporate management, investment capital, and decision-making authority identified in this report is concentrated outside the state.

This creates a fundamental imbalance: those who control and profit from industrial fishing are often geographically removed from the communities and ecosystems that bear many of its resource and environmental consequences. When ownership, profits, and decision-making authority are concentrated outside Alaska while those consequences remain within Alaska's waters and communities, that geographic divide should be central to evaluating whether the current structure of the industrial trawl fleet serves Alaska's long-term interests.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of North Pacific catch-share programs came with structural consequences that extend well beyond the fishing grounds. By tying access to established vessels, processing capacity, regulatory eligibility, and capital, the system helped create a highly concentrated industrial sector in which a small number of corporate groups control a disproportionate share of Alaska's trawl capacity.

The result is concentrated ownership as well as economic, political, and institutional power.

Today, Alaska's industrial trawl sector is overwhelmingly controlled by out-of-state corporate interests, particularly the Outside 12, whose companies control much of the fleet's most valuable harvesting and processing capacity. The consequences of that structure are felt in Alaska even when the economic benefits and decision-making authority are located elsewhere.

First, a significant share of the wealth generated from Alaska's public marine resources leaves the state. Corporate ownership, management, investment capital, and high-value maritime services are concentrated outside Alaska, while the state retains a smaller share of the industry's economic returns. Alaska communities receive jobs, processing activity, and tax revenues, but much of the underlying value accrues to out-of-state corporations, investors, and maritime centers.

Second, consolidation makes local entry increasingly difficult. The vessels, permits, processing relationships, financing, expertise, and regulatory access required to participate in industrial trawl fisheries are concentrated among established firms. This creates a self-reinforcing system in which companies that already control access to the fishery are best positioned to acquire additional assets and maintain their market position, while Alaska fishermen and new entrants face substantially greater barriers to building comparable operations.

Third, economic concentration translates into political and institutional influence. The same companies that control substantial portions of the fleet can pool resources through trade associations, maintain dedicated regulatory and government-relations staff, commission technical research, and participate continuously in federal fisheries decision-making. With major industry organizations such as the At-Sea Processors Association and Groundfish Forum operating from Seattle, some of the most organized voices shaping policy for Alaska's fisheries are based outside the communities most directly affected by those decisions.

Finally, concentrated ownership also concentrates resource or environmental responsibility. A relatively small number of corporate groups operate a large share of Alaska's industrial trawl capacity and therefore account for a substantial portion of the sector's bycatch, habitat interactions, and other ecological impacts. When environmental costs are borne primarily by Alaska's ecosystems and communities while ownership, profits, and policy resources are concentrated elsewhere, the geographic separation between those who benefit from the resource and those who bear its consequences becomes particularly significant.

These effects are interconnected. The same system that concentrates access to Alaska's fisheries can concentrate wealth, ownership, political influence, and environmental responsibility in the hands of a relatively small number of corporate interests. Geographic distance compounds that imbalance: decisions about Alaska's public marine resources are made by companies and institutions headquartered hundreds or thousands of miles from the communities that depend most directly on healthy fisheries.

The central issue, therefore, is whether the current distribution of ownership, economic benefits, political influence, and environmental costs serves Alaska's long-term interests.

Alaska's fisheries are public resources. A management system that provides durable access to those resources should be evaluated not only by how efficiently it produces fish, but also by who controls that access, who captures the resulting wealth, who has the greatest ability to influence the rules, and who bears the consequences when the ecosystem and local fisheries suffer.

The evidence presented in this report suggests that these benefits and burdens are increasingly asymmetric: a concentrated, predominantly out-of-state corporate sector captures a substantial share of the economic and institutional value generated by Alaska's fisheries, while Alaska communities remain exposed to many of the industry's environmental, economic, and social consequences. Understanding and addressing that imbalance should be central to future debates over the management and allocation of Alaska's marine resources.

APPENDIX

Summary Vessel Matrix

Ultimate Beneficiary Owner (UBO)	HQ Location	Catcher / Processors (C/Ps)	Motherships (MTHs)	Catcher Vessels (CVs)	Total Fleet Assets	Primary Trawl Fisheries
American Seafoods Company LLC	Seattle, WA	8	0	0	8	AFA Pollock
Trident Seafoods Corporation	Seattle, WA	3	0	12	15	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
Glacier Fish Company LLC ⁴	Seattle, WA	6	0	1	7	AFA Pollock, Amendment 80, GOA Rockfish
Arctic Storm Management Group LLC	Seattle, WA	2	0	2	4	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
US Marine Corp / Ocean Peace ⁵	Seattle, WA	4	0	2	6	AFA Pollock, Amendment 80, PCTC, GOA
United States Seafoods LLC / Matt Doherty	Seattle, WA	8	0	1	9	Amendment 80, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
O'Hara Corporation	Seattle, WA / ME	5	0	0	5	Amendment 80, GOA Rockfish
Fishermen's Finest Inc	Kirkland, WA	3	0	0	3	Amendment 80, GOA Rockfish
Global Seas LLC / Dona Martita LLC	Seattle, WA	1	0	5	6	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
Great West Seafoods LP / C&D Fisheries Inc	Seattle, WA	1	0	6	7	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
Bering North LLC	Seattle, WA	0	0	10	10	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
Maruha Nichiro Corp. (Umios) ⁶	Tokyo, Japan	0	0	2	2	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
Coastal Villages Region Fund (CDQ)	Anchorage, AK	1	2	3	6	AFA Pollock
Yukon Delta Fisheries Dev. Assoc. (CDQ)	Anchorage, AK	0	1	4	5	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
Alaska Boat Company LLC / BSAI Partners (CDQ joint venture)	Anchorage, AK	0	0	5	5	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
Top 15 combined	–	42	3	53	98	All Catch-Share Programs

Summary Ownership Matrix

Ultimate Beneficiary Owner (UBO)	HQ Location	AFA Pollock	Amendment 80	PCTC Cod	GOA Rockfish	Primary Asset Class Controlled
American Seafoods Company LLC	Seattle, WA	✓	—	✓	—	AFA Pollock
Trident Seafoods Corporation	Seattle, WA	✓	—	✓	✓	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
Glacier Fish Company LLC ⁴	Seattle, WA	✓	✓	—	✓	AFA Pollock, Amendment 80, GOA Rockfish
Arctic Storm Management Group LLC	Seattle, WA	✓	—	✓	—	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
US Marine Corp / Ocean Peace ⁵	Seattle, WA	✓	✓	✓	✓	AFA Pollock, Amendment 80, PCTC, GOA
United States Seafoods LLC / Matt Doherty	Seattle, WA	—	✓	✓	✓	Amendment 80, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
O'Hara Corporation	Seattle, WA / ME	—	✓	—	✓	Amendment 80, GOA Rockfish
Fishermen's Finest Inc	Kirkland, WA	—	✓	—	✓	Amendment 80, GOA Rockfish
Global Seas LLC / Dona Martita LLC	Seattle, WA	✓	—	✓	—	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
Great West Seafoods LP / C&D Fisheries Inc	Seattle, WA	✓	—	✓	✓	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
Bering North LLC	Seattle, WA	✓	—	✓	✓	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod, GOA Rockfish
Maruha Nichiro Corp. (Umios) ⁶	Tokyo, Japan	✓	—	✓	—	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
Coastal Villages Region Fund (CDQ)	Anchorage, AK	✓	—	—	—	AFA Pollock
Yukon Delta Fisheries Dev. Assoc. (CDQ)	Anchorage, AK	✓	—	✓	—	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod
Alaska Boat Company LLC / BSAI Partners (CDQ joint venture)	Anchorage, AK	✓	—	✓	—	AFA Pollock, PCTC Cod

Out-of-State Ownership Concentration Summary by Fleet

Catch-Share Program	Total Vessels	Out-of-State Controlled	% Out-of-State	Primary Out-of-State Hub
Amendment 80 (A80)	19	19	100%	Greater Seattle, WA
AFA Pollock Fleet	110	90	82%	Greater Seattle, WA / Tokyo, JP
Pacific Cod Trawl Co-op	71	62	87%	Greater Seattle, WA
Gulf of Alaska Rockfish	46	33	72%	Seattle, WA / Newport, OR

- 4 Glacier Fish Company operates 7 total factory trawlers (3 AFA pollock C/Ps and 4 Amendment 80 C/Ps via its North Star Fishing Company division).
- 5 US Marine Corp / Ocean Peace controls 4 A80 factory trawlers (Ocean Peace, Seafisher, Alaska Victory, Alaska Warrior) and 1 dedicated catcher vessel (Green Hope).
- 6 Maruha Nichiro: Operates 2 dedicated catcher vessels through subsidiary Pacific Knight LLC. (Note: Excludes onshore plants operated via Westward Seafoods).

REFERENCES

Alaska Department of Commerce:

- <https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/cbp/main/search/entities>

Washington Secretary of State:

- <https://www.sos.wa.gov/corporations-charities>

Oregon Secretary of State:

- <https://sos.oregon.gov/business/Pages/find.aspx>

Triton Vessel Ownership Database:

- <https://app.triton.fish/>

Catch Share and Limited Access Programs:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/sustainable-fisheries/catch-share-and-limited-access-programs-alaska>

Community Development Quota program:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/sustainable-fisheries/community-development-quota-cdq-program>

Groundfish Quota Programs (AFA, Amendment 80, CGOA Rockfish):

- <https://www.npfmc.org/fisheries-issues/catch-shares-allocations/groundfish-quota-programs/>

American Fisheries Act:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/sustainable-fisheries/american-fisheries-act-pollock-fisheries-management-alaska>
- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/permit/american-fisheries-act-pollock-applications-and-forms>

Amendment 80:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/sustainable-fisheries/bering-sea-and-aleutian-islands-amendment-80-groundfish-trawl-fishery>
- <https://www.nationalfisherman.com/recertification-of-flatfish-fisheries-as-sustainable-challenged>

Pacific Cod Trawl Cooperative Program:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/commercial-fishing/pacific-cod-trawl-cooperative-program>

Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Program:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/sustainable-fisheries/central-gulf-alaska-goa-rockfish-program>

Fishery Permits and Licenses Issued in Alaska:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/commercial-fishing/permits-and-licenses-issued-alaska>

Fisheries Catch and Landings Report in Alaska:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/commercial-fishing/fisheries-catch-and-landings-reports-alaska>

Alaska Groundfish Harvest Specifications:

- <https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/alaska/commercial-fishing/2026-2027-alaska-groundfish-harvest-specifications#gulf-of-alaska-goa>

Bering Sea 2026/2027 Harvest Specifications for Groundfish:

- <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/10/2026-04684/fisheries-of-the-exclusive-economic-zone-off-alaska-bering-sea-and-aleutian-islands-2026-and-2027>

Gulf of Alaska 2026/2027 Harvest Specifications for Groundfish:

- <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/11/2026-04753/fisheries-of-the-exclusive-economic-zone-off-alaska-gulf-of-alaska-2026-and-2027-harvest>

National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and North Pacific Fishery Management Council. Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Regulatory Impact Review for a Proposed Amendment to the Fishery Management Plan for Groundfish of the Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands Management Area: Bering Sea Chum Salmon Bycatch Management:

- https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/resource/document/draft-environmental-impact-statement-and-regulatory-impact-review-proposed?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Northern Economics. The Economic Contribution of the Alaska Pollock Fishery. Prepared for the Alaska Pollock Fishery Alliance (APFA):

- https://northerneconomics.com/wp-content/uploads/Economic-Impacts-of-the-Alaska-Pollock-Industry_Final_11132025-1.pdf

Northern Economics. The Economic Contribution of the Alaska Pollock Fishery. Anchorage, AK: Northern Economics, 2025, Table 5, 17; Laine Welch. "Local Job Numbers Touted in the Alaska Pollock Fishery Don't Add Up." Alaska Fish News:

- <https://alaskafish.news/03/2026/local-job-numbers-touted-in-the-alaska-pollock-fishery-dont-add-up/>